RTE 1’s Inside Nationwide on Monday traced Irish Nationwide’s meteoric rise in profits from IR£12,000 in 1975 to €391million in 2007.

Richard Curran (above) and Tom Lyons (2nd pic) reported how Ernst and Young and solicitors McCann Fitzgerald were hired to carry out an investigation into the building society, following Michael Fingleton’s resignation in April 2009.

Mr Lyons and Mr Curran reported how the information contained in the subsequent report is so sensitive, successive governments have refused to publish it.

The report catalogues dire lending practices, disastrous risk management records and a virtually non-existent practice of keeping a coherent trail of documentation or records. And Mr Fingleton didn’t use a computer.

The documentary also briefly mentioned how Mr Fingleton courted the Press in the mid-1970s, with Paul Drury, from the Irish Daily Mail, recounting how he first met Fingers at one of his Christmas parties.

Later, Mr Curran says:

“Back then Michael Fingleton often made himself available to journalists. They came to his parties. He was available for quotes and comment. And, on top of that, he was happy to advance them money to buy their first homes. Irish Nationwide began building a profitable business providing savings accounts and mortgages and Michael Fingleton became the go-to man of the financial industry. His journalist contacts knew they could give him a call when doing a piece on banking.”

The documentary also heard from Olivia Greene, who was employed at INBS, but didn’t mention that Ms Greene told a 2011 employment tribunal that, when it came to lending, there were certain criteria for the general public and a different set of criteria for people in certain social circles – including members of the government, media and close friends.

So why didn’t the documentary examine the role of a mortgaged-up media in Irish Nationwide’s rise?

Ah.

Another buke.

Previously: You Probably Wonder Why This Guy Seems Untouchable

TheStory.ie has obtained a confidential plan submitted by Anglo Irish Bank/Irish Nationwide to the European Commission, which was put together by a working group from the Department of Finance, the NTMA, the Central Bank, Anglo and INBS.

The plan, dated January 31, 2011 was submitted to the European Commission for approval and was guided by the agreement reached between the Irish authorities, the EU, the IMF and ECB in November 2010. It outlines in detail the workout plan for the IBRC entity from now until 2020, under two headline scenarios – a base and stress scenario.

Under the the base scenario, IBRC says it could lose €3.5bn between 2011 and 2020, while under the stress scenario it could lose €8.1 billion. The bulk of these losses would be incurred in 2011/2012. It projects a loss of at least €400m between 2016 and 2020.

IBRC’s residential loan book will be prepared for eventual sale, probably in 2015. A 30% haircut is expected in the stress scenario leading to a loss to the taxpayer of €300 million.

Under a stress scenario outlined by the bank, IBRC will need an additional €3.2bn of equity capital which will be ‘drip fed’ across the plan period. The injections are required to keep an 8% total capital ratio. This drip feeding will be done in tranches of €1.7bn, €1.3bn, €0.01bn, €0.04bn and €0.2bn.

IBRC will be reliant on the Central Bank/ELA funding for the duration of the plan, right up to 2020. IBRC will need €36.7bn funding from the CBI/ELA by 2015 and €15.9bn by 2019 under the base case.